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Monetary union demonstrates that some EU projects are realised without preparation for all eventualities. In the
case of the euro, the financial crisis revealed lacunae in the field of economic and budgetary supervision, which
the euro countries had to bridge through the introduction of new instruments. In the case of Union citizenship the
legal gaps are less dramatic, but nonetheless visible – in particular with regard to access to social benefits for
persons who do not work. It was these uncertainties that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had to confront in
the Dano judgment of last Tuesday. It opts for a surprisingly conventional solution, which abandons earlier
attempts to conceive of Union citizenship as a projection sphere for political visions of a good life and just
society.
The European Court of Justice as Legal Technician
A reminder of the debate about the Free Movement Directive demonstrates the absence of clear political
guidance. Initially, the EU Commission had suggested to lay down explicitly that Union citizens who do not work
should not have access to social benefits during the first five years of their stay in another EU country (Art. 21.2).
It later abandoned the project after the ECJ had ruled in Grzelczyk that similar provisions on study grants do not
pre-empt recourse to the Treaty guarantee of non-discrimination. As a result, the final version of the Free
Movement Directive reiterated existing Treaty rules, whose precise bearing for people like Ms Dano remained
unclear. Otherwise put, there was never a positive political agreement at EU level on the status of Union citizens
who do not work. This shifted the responsibility upon judges to resolve open questions.
Judges in Luxembourg used this room for manoeuvre for progressive decisions on various occasions.
Judgments such as Grzelczyk, Martínez Sala, Collins, Trojani, Bidar, Vatsouras and Ruiz Zambrano constitute
the most ambitious and tantalising line of case law in recent memory. They are characterised by an attempt to
breathe life into the abstract Treaty provisions on Union citizenship by granting equal access to social benefits for
various categories of economically inactive citizens irrespective of the limits laid down in secondary legislation. It
would have been possible for the Court to decide the Dano case differently under recourse to the argumentative
arsenal of these judgments.
That did not happen. For more than a decade, the ECJ had ignored the arguments put forward by his most
outspoken academic critic, Kay Hailbronner – but they now dominate its reasoning on why citizens like Ms Dano
cannot claim social benefits. This presents us with a noteworthy shift of emphasis from a promise of equality
inherent in EU citizenship towards the ‘limitations and conditions’, which primary law had always provided for
(Art. 21.1 TFEU). Judges abandon the aspirational underpinning of the citizenship concept to the benefit of
conventional doctrinal arguments such as the wording or the systematic structure. In short, the Court turns into a
legal technician.
Anuscheh Farahat criticises the Court’s outcome and, yet, she follows a similar path as the ECJ, when she
argues that the technical rules on inter-state social security coordination mandated a different outcome. It is not
convincing to maintain that this specialised field of secondary law should have defined the answer, not least
since doing so would have required the Court to disconnect the interpretation of the non-discrimination principle
in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) Nr. 883/2004 from primary law. A fundamental question, such as this one, should
be answered primarily on the basis of the EU Treaties and the citizenship concept – even by those who disagree
with the Court’s conclusion.
It seems to me that the outcome of the Dano case is no coincidence. Judges in Luxembourg are not autistic and
listen to the general political context. The Pringle judgment on the compatibility of the ESM Treaty with the rules
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on monetary union was a case in point – and the same held for the Förster ruling, in which the Court shied away
from open conflict with the EU legislator, when it accepted a five-year waiting period for access to study grants
for incoming EU students in line with the Free Movement Directive. The Grand Chamber deciding the Dano case
will have considered potential implications of its judgment for the overall support for the integration project at a
time, when eurosceptic political parties are on rise across the continent, not only in the United Kingdom.
Certitude instead of Ambivalence
The ECJ’s conclusion is surprisingly clear-cut. In three argumentative steps it finds that Union citizens who are
economically inactive need sufficient resources to maintain themselves; without these resources they hold no
right to free movement and cannot, as a result, invoke the non-discrimination guarantees of Union law. For this
outcome, the subjective intention of the person concerned is irrelevant – notwithstanding the reference to
citizens who move ‘solely in order to obtain … social assistance‘ (para 78). The official answer given to the
domestic court and the legal reasoning leave no doubt that equal treatment cannot be claimed in the absence of
free movement rights, irrespective of the individual motivation why citizens moved to another Member State.
Such clarity was no foregone conclusion. One characteristic of the above-mentioned line of earlier judgments is
the orientation at the facts of the case at hand. Judges in Luxembourg have repeatedly rejected abstract national
legal rules, which did not take account of the living situation of the person concerned. Doctrinally, this emphasis
on the individual rests upon the ‘certain degree of integration’ formula, which judges in Luxembourg had
established as the relevant yardstick – albeit without laying down precise criteria how national authorities should
apply this rule.
In Dano, the Grand Chamber evades these pitfalls by excluding citizens without a free movement right from the
scope of the non-discrimination principle ratione personae. This has the advantage of not shifting the final
decision upon administrative authorities, since it is questionable to let civil servants decide on a case-by-case
basis whether citizens are sufficiently integrated into the host society. Such issues are best decided by the
legislator, which had unfortunately evaded clear guidance for the Court in the adoption of the Free Movement
Directive. Against this background, the Dano judgment may be read as a welcome exercise in judicial restraint.
Notwithstanding the clear outcome, the Dano judgment resolves not all practical and/or legal problems
surrounding free movement. We learnt last Tuesday that those who do not work cannot rely upon free movement
and non-discrimination guarantees without sufficient ressources, while the legal status of job-seekers with
‘genuine chances of being engaged’ remains unresolved as long as the ambiguities of the Vatsouras judgment
have not been untangled. Moreover, there continue to be principled uncertainties how to define the ‘sufficient
resources’ criterion, which determines whether citizens outside the labour market can claim a free movement
right in the first place.
With regard to Ms Dano, the ECJ relied upon the conclusion of the domestic court that this was not the case
(para 81). Any such evaluation follows the standards put forward in the Brey judgment of September 2013, which
instructed national authorities to assess whether the person concerned was ‘becoming an “unreasonable”
burden’ on the social security system of the host state – without being crystal clear whether the underlying
proportionality test concerns the individual case only or, alternatively, the overall situation in the host country. In
Dano, the Grand Chamber indirectly opts for the first solution with the focus on the individual (para 80). For this
reason, Farahat’s criticism of the absence of an empirical assessment of the overall situation in Germany misses
the point, since the Grand Chamber considers the latter to be legally irrelevant.
Limits of European Integration
Across Europe, it is often said that the ECJ will opt for ‘more integration’ in cases of doubt. It seems to me that
this conviction is loop-sided and can be explained, among others, by a tendency on the side of the Court to
combine radical landmark judgment with more restrictive follow-up rulings, most recently in later retreats from
the innovative Åkerberg Fransson and Ruiz Zambrano judgments. Against this background, the Dano decision
should be seen as a prominent counterpoint to the expansive reading of Union citizenship in earlier case law.
The latter remains intact as a matter of principle, but it is not extended Union citizens who are economically
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inactive.
This outcome is remarkable in itself, but it also has wider repercussions for our understanding of European Union
law. By establishing the ‘citizenship’ of the Union, the Treaty of Maastricht had introduced a concept into the
primary law, which may serve as a projection sphere for political visions of a good life and a just society; it is the
aspirational openness of the citizenship concept which explains why it has long guided the call for ever wider
social and political inclusion. In Ruiz Zambrano, the Court followed down this road (only to retreat a few months
later). To me, it is the most noteworthy lesson from the Dano judgment that this road was not followed. Judges in
Luxembourg treat the free movement of Union citizens in essence as a matter of legal construction – not as a
projection sphere for political imaginations about social justice.
For legal academics, this approach presents a powerful reminder that there are limits to transformative
integration through law. Treaty changes and case law alone are not capable of establishing an enhanced degree
of pan-European identity and solidarity – irrespective of whether the Court considers Union citizenship to be
‘destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States.’  National and European constitutional
rules are no self-fulfilling prophecies, but need to be embedded into social structures and the political life across
Europe. They participate in the constant reconstructing of identities and self-perceptions, but cannot change
them single-handedly. It is an achievement of the Dano judgment not to have overstretched Union citizenship.
This does not imply that Union citizenship has lost its relevance. Earlier case law remains intact and continues to
pose important questions – as another pending reference demonstrates, which requires the Court to decide
whether the rigidity of the Dano case can be extended to jobseekers with genuine chances of being employed.
Luxembourg may have rejected a quasi-federal understanding with expansive equal treatment guarantees for
all, thereby continuing a number of recent judgments, which can be read as painting a picture of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
citizens. Doing so effectively reactivates the traditional notion of ‘market citizenship’, which concentrates on
those who engage in transnational economic activities. In this resect, Union citizenship remains incomplete, if its
promise of equality does not extend to all those who have the status.
To be continued – in the Member States…
The outcome of the Dano case is not just a reminder of the limits of European Union law; it also relegates
responsibility to the national arena. This is emphasised by the Court’s answer to the fourth question, which
unequivocally rejects an application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights with its extensive social rights and
principles to the Dano case (paras 85-92). Doctrinally, this conclusion is straightforward given that the Grand
Chamber rejects an application of both the free movement law and the non-discrimination principle. Yet, this
accentuates the rejection, on the side of the Court, to embark upon broader constitutional imaginations of social
justice. The Charter may embrace some generously formulated social rights and principles, but their impact is
limited indeed – both for Ms Dano and for austerity measures as a response to the euro crisis .
In a certain way, the European Court of Justice abdicates responsibility by handing the future fate of Ms Dano
back to national authorities. German authorities will now have to decide whether to deport the single mother and
her little sun (something which authorities are, for good reasons, never keen to do), also knowing that Ms Dano
might soon afterwards try to return to Germany in order to live again with her sister in Leipzig. Thus, the
presence of ‘illegal’ EU migrants without free movement rights might soon become a reality across Europe. This
might prompt the European Court of Human Rights to step in, which had found in an important judgment one
week earlier that states are obliged to provide shelter and basic social services to asylum seekers as a human
rights’ requirement. Ms Dano might soon ask for the same treatment. This call will not be directed to
Luxembourg, though. For the ECJ this file has been closed. Others will have to take responsibility for those
holding a ‘fundamental status’ called Union citizenship.
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